Introduction
The shameful fact that the majority of South Africa's population lives in abject poverty is well documented.1 Poverty on such a large scale has been described at worst as the main cause and at best as a major contributing factor to a multitude of serious social problems such as the high rate of violent crime, the high rate of illiteracy, the high incidence of HIV/Aids and unemployment. Bluntly put, poverty is to blame for jeopardising the very fabric of South African society and consequently the security of the South African population. It is no small wonder that the main objective of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) has been described as the alleviation of poverty.2
The legislature has made a very bold attempt to uplift its citizens. Amongst others, the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 (Social Assistance Act)3 provides for monthly payments to citizens under certain prescribed conditions. In situations where other legislation does not provide a remedy for those unable to Kwazulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at 770-771 at par 8. He stated: "We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of people are living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of unemployment, inadequate social security, and many do not have access to clean water or to adequate health services. These conditions already existed when the Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them, and to transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional order. For as long as these conditions continue to exist that aspiration will have a hollow ring. care for themselves the Constitution provides for justiciable4 socio-economic rights.5 Unfortunately legislative rights alone have proved insufficient and all too frequently the constitutional values and aspirations of human dignity and equality have had a "hollow ring".6 The most obvious reason for this failure of delivery on the part of the government is of course a shortage of financial resources.7 However, this is not the only reason for this failure. Another reason has been a simple disregard for the terms of legislation and court orders by organs of the state and state employees.8 We are of the view that in order to avoid such a dire result, in the interests of all South Africans, the courts, given their broadly framed constitutional powers, should be adventurous in crafting means to ensure that their orders are properly implemented and adhered to.
The purpose of this article is to explore the role that courts can play in ensuring proper implementation of both the terms of social security legislation as well as the implementation of court orders.9 Although it may appear that our proposals are limited to specific problems relating to non-compliance with Eastern Cape welfare judgments, there is no reason for limiting our proposals to this province's judgments. We propose that the solution suggested herein should be utilised where there is flagrant disregard of court orders by state officials. Although most of the cases discussed occurred in the Eastern Cape, it is obvious that what we propose applies to the whole country. In fact this problem, although concentrated in the Eastern Cape, is also prevalent in Natal. See Broughton The Mercury http://www.iol.co.za/ 29 Dec at 3. The concentration of the Eastern Cape is a natural consequence of the fact that this is where much of the flagrant disregard of court orders has occurred.
Failure to implement legislative provisions of the Social Assistance
Act and failure to adhere to court orders The state's failure to implement legislative provisions of the Social Assistance Act is rife in the Eastern Cape.10 Such failure comes in various forms: a failure to timeously and expeditiously consider applications for social grants and a failure to implement payments once the social grants have been approved.11
The cause of this state of affairs has been attributed to sheer laziness and incompetence on the part of the officials of the Department of Social Development.12 This maladministration in the Eastern Cape has been described as a "conspicuous and endemic".13 Given the fact that the victims of this maladministration are poor and lack the necessary financial and other means to turn to the courts for help, this means that the plethora of cases that reach the courts is only the tip of the iceberg.14 Clearly such a state of affairs threatens the very foundations of our Constitution and democracy thus justifying intervention by the judiciary. Plasket J comments as follows in this regard:
10 Nugent JA in MEC v Kate 2006 (4) SA 478 (SCA) 483 at par 5 notes: "What is particularly distressing is that there seems to be no end in sight. An affidavit deposed to by the attorney for the Black Sash (which was admitted as amicus curiae in the present appeal) records that, in a period of six weeks during the latter part of 2005, there were almost 2000 such cases on the role of the High Court. On one occasion Plasket J noted that there were 102 cases relating to social assistance on his Motion Court roll for that week, and he went on to say the following: ' If this volume of social assistance cases had been unique to one week's Motion Court roll, it would have been cause for concern. Unfortunately it is a phenomenon that is common: the Judges of this Division have grown accustomed to the depressing tales of misery and privation contained in an ever-increasing volume of cases that clog their Motion Court rolls in which applicants complain about administration torpor in the processing of their applications for social assistance. To make matters worse, this situation is not new. Over the last four or five years Judges have commented, often in strident terms, about the unsatisfactory performance of the respondent's department in the administration of the social assistance system in the province'. provides that a court may grant 'appropriate relief' in circumstances where an infringement of any right contained in the Bill of Rights has been established. In terms of sections 172(1)(b) and 167(7), when courts are faced with "any issue involving the interpretation, protection or enforcement of the Constitution" they are empowered to make any order that is 'just and equitable'. In terms of sections 173 and 8(3) the courts are empowered to develop the common law in order to give effect to constitutional rights. Clearly the Constitution grants the courts extensive scope in fashioning their orders.28
Our discussion is limited to the means adopted in the court order to ensure that the order is complied with.29
In spite of such broadly framed powers in terms of the Constitution there have been instances where the judiciary may have displayed unnecessary caution with regard to crafting orders to ensure compliance. This is especially the case when the state is required to take action in terms of an order. Such caution is motivated by a fear of encroaching on executive territory. The result has been conservative and ineffective court orders. In Minister of Health v TAC30 the Constitutional Court held that although an order to the effect that state has failed to give effect to its constitutional obligations in formulating and implementing policies may constitute an intrusion into executive functions,31 the 28 The latitude given to the courts to fashion remedies is not limited to their scope to fashion means to ensure compliance with the orders. It extends to the power to decide what exactly the offending party has to do in order to remedy the situation. With regard to ensuring governmental compliance with its duty to provide for certain socio-economic rights the courts have generally adopted a conservative approach for fear of treading on executive territory. Consequently court orders dealing with this issue have thus far been somewhat vague in the sense that the orders do not explicitly provide for what it is that the government should do in order to comply with its constitutional duties. See Davies supra n 22. 29 Remedial options need not necessarily be pursued in the alternative. The facts of a case may require a combination of the different orders. 30 Minister of Health v TAC 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 31 Davies supra n 22 at 304 explains the reasons for the reluctance of the Constitutional Court to formulate policy: "In general the Constitutional Court has been reluctant to impose additional policy burdens on government, notwithstanding the imperative to give some content to these rights as contained in the text of the Constitution. The less the burden of the Constitutional Court to exercise supervision over the executive, the more comfortable it feels in its role as the ultimate enforcer of accountability. Thus, the Court provides an interpretation of these rights and then approaches the question of appropriate relief in a manner that proclaims its constitutional custodial role without forcing the hand of the executive. The source of this approach is to be found not only in the restrictive legal repertoire employed by the Court, but also in the political and the economic context in which current legal practice is located…".
courts are mandated and obliged to make such an order in terms of the PER /PELJ 2007(10)3
Constitution. Despite this acknowledgement, the court limited itself to a declaratory order and failed to make use of a structural interdict. The court said:
The order made by the High Court included a structural interdict requiring the appellants to revise their policy and to submit the revised policy to the Court to enable it to satisfy itself that the policy was consistent with the Constitution. In Pretoria City Council this Court recognised that Courts have such powers. In appropriate cases they should exercise such power if it is necessary to secure compliance with a court order. That may be because of a failure to heed declaratory orders or other relief granted by a Court in a particular case. We do not consider, however, that orders should be made in those terms unless this is necessary. The government has always respected and executed orders of this Court. There is no reason to believe that it will not do so in the present case.32
In the wake of Grootboom33 such confidence in the government's will to comply with court orders was misplaced and naïve. The failure of government to act until further prodding by the TAC34 is further testimony to the fact that the Constitutional Court erred in assuming that it was unnecessary for it to play a supervisory role in order to ensure implementation of its order by the government. In a similar vein, the Constitutional Court in the case of Rail
Commuters Action Group and Others v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail and Others35
refrained from granting a structural interdict and restricted its order to a declaratory order. The court concluded that even though an order putting Having noted the unfortunate consequences of an unwillingness and ignorance on the part of the government and its organs to abide by court orders36 combined with the cautious approach adopted by the courts thus far, especially the Constitutional Court, various possible options available to the judiciary that will ensure compliance with its orders will be discussed.
4
The structural interdict
Although there is no clear and formal definition of a structural interdict,37 briefly, it is a remedy in terms of which the court orders an organ of state to perform its constitutional obligations and to report to the court on its progress in doing so.38
In other words, the court plays a supervisory role in ensuring state compliance with its order. The structural interdict is particularly useful and appropriate when it comes to enforcing state compliance with its duty to provide socio-economic rights. Firstly, since the state is obliged to report to the court on its progress in implementing the terms of the order, the structural interdict is particularly suitable for the enforcement of duties which are ongoing, such as socioeconomic rights. A feature rendering the structural interdict attractive in these circumstances is that the court can devise a time frame within which the order must be complied with. …as the manner in which the Department discharges its duties and obligations to refugees not only deleteriously affects the freedom and dignity of a substantial number of disadvantaged human beings, but also fails to adhere to the values embodied in the Constitution, I incline to the view that the instant case is an appropriate one for the granting of a structural interdict.
Very briefly, this case concerned the policy and procedure adopted by the Western Cape refugee centre of inter alia accepting only 20 applications for asylum per day. The effect of this policy was that since asylum seekers whose applications were not attended to remained 'illegal foreigners', they ran the risk of detention and deportation in terms of sections 32, 33 and 34 of the Immigration Act.41 As pointed out by Van Reenen J this is obviously an invasion of the constitutionally protected rights to human dignity and freedom of security of one's person. Consequently, the remedy of a structural interdict was considered to be appropriate.42 Thirdly, given the extent of poverty in South Africa, the provision of these rights is usually urgent, thus rendering a structural interdict in terms of which the state has to report back on its progress within a given time frame particularly useful.
In other judgment creditors whom the province had failed to pay. Thirdly, the applicant acted in the public interest in that the province's failure to abide by court orders made against it on a broad scale in social grant matters is a matter that should be addressed in the interests of the public at large. The applicant sought an order -… to compel the respondents to fulfil their constitutional and statutory obligation to comply with court orders made against the province, by not only taking all the steps necessary to ensure payment of the sums owing by the province to the applicant and others, but also to report to the court the manner and extent of their compliance. If they fail to do this the applicant seeks leave to approach this court again for further relief.44
In granting the structural interdict requested, Froneman J pointed out that it is a remedy that has been sanctioned by our courts.45 He stated that the structural interdict was appropriate in the circumstances before him because the failure by the state to ensure compliance with court orders had been 'persistent and lengthy'.46 The implication seems to be that court supervision is necessary because the state cannot be trusted to do its duty and the non-compliance occurs on an ongoing and continuous basis. By granting the structural interdict the court was not encroaching on executive territory. It was not telling the state how to go about performing its statutory and legislative duties. It was simply ensuring that the state did what it was obliged to do and doing what it in turn was constitutionally bound to do. In the words of Froneman J:
The Constitution has been described as a "transformative" constitution in that it commits the South African people to achieve a new kind of society in which people have the social resources they need to exercise their rights meaningfully. In this case the constitutional duty of the respondents was to give effect to the fundamental right of the applicant and others to social security and assistance under section 27 of the Constitution, by properly administering the provisions of the Social Assistance Act. This includes reasonable measures to make the system effective. The constitutional duty of the courts in this regard is not to tell the respondents how to do this, but merely to ensure that they do take reasonable measures to make the system effective. In this manner the respondents (representing the province), as well as the courts, are enjoined to ensure the realisation of the same goal, albeit in different ways. The respondents do not have a choice but to administer the administration of grants in a reasonable manner making the system effective. The courts have no choice but to give redress when this is not done. And after the courts have made a final pronouncement on the issue in accordance with legal procedures, the respondents have no constitutional choice to disregard the courts' judgments. If they nevertheless do, the courts in turn have no constitutional choice other than to ensure as far as possible that practical effect is given to those judgments.47 (Footnotes omitted.)
We hope that should the occasion present itself in the future, the Constitutional Court will take a less cautionary approach than it has in the past and make use of the remedy of structural relief (as the High Courts have done). In this way, successful litigants have some hope that their victories in court will have some positive practical consequences.48 A failure to do so will render the concept of justiciable socio-economic rights a mockery.
5

Contempt of court
Normally when a judgment creditor is faced with non-compliance with a judgment debt payable in money, the judgment debtor's property can be attached and sold in order to pay the creditor. This judgment was approved and followed by other judgments in the Eastern Cape.55 The justification for this approach was that the courts are empowered in terms of the Constitution to develop the common law so as to further the promotion of constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court of Appeal, per Conradie JA, in Jayiya held that this approach was incorrect because:
The common law cannot evolve in conflict with statute or basic principles of the law…Moreover the common law must evolve in a principled way. One of the fundamental tenets of the common law is that of legality: it cannot evolve in such a way as to (retrospectively) create a new crime or extend the limits of an existing one. This is what the decisions in the Eastern Cape appear to have done. Contempt of court, even civil contempt of court, is a criminal offence. The way our common law has developed, it can be committed only by deliberately mala fide ignoring orders of Court ad factum praestandum: it cannot by judicial extension be made to embrace orders ad pecuniam solvendam. Not even the Legislature can make conduct retrospectively punishable. The Constitution forbids it. An accused's right to a fair trial includes, in s 35(3)(1) the right 'not to be convicted for an act or an omission that was not an offence under either national or international law at the time it was committed or omitted'.56 (Footnotes omitted.)
Conradie JA also reasoned that it made little sense that an employee could go to prison for her employer's debt when legislation prevents her imprisonment for failure to pay her own debt.57 The practical consequence of this judgment is that successful litigants with court orders sounding in money against the state in their favour, faced with a state organ that ignores the court orders can neither successfully have state officials who were responsible for implementing the order, but failed to do so, imprisoned for contempt of court, nor attach state property in execution of the debts owing to them. places the state above the law.58 The problem with this solution,59 for our purposes, is that unless and until this section is declared to be constitutionally invalid in terms of section 172 of the Constitution, the courts will have to apply it. Section 6 of the [Social Assistance] Act properly construed, obliges the Director General to consider and decide upon an application for a social grant, and to do so lawfully, procedurally fairly, and with due diligence and promptitude. It goes without saying that a public functionary who fails to fulfil an obligation that is imposed upon him or her by law is open to proceedings for a mandamus compelling him or her to do so. That remedy lies against the functionary upon whom the statute imposes the obligation, and not against the provincial government… Moreover, there ought to be no doubt that a public official who is ordered by a court to do or refrain from doing a particular act and fails to do so is liable to be committed for contempt in accordance with ordinary principles and there is nothing in Jayiya that suggests the contrary.62 (Own emphasis.)
6
Delictual damages
The plethora of cases in the Eastern Cape concerning social security grants have demonstrated a lack of accountability, a culture of passing the buck, The South African common law of delict is flexible and, under s 35(3) of the Interim Constitution, should be developed by the Courts with 'due regard to the spirit, purport and objects' of ch 3. In many cases, the common law will be broad enough to provide all the relief that would be 'appropriate' for breach of constitutional rights… negligently or in mala fides neglects to properly perform his duties (while acting on behalf of the state in his capacity as employee of the state), and so causes other(s) to suffer damages, cannot be held personally liable in delict for the damages so caused.67
As discussed under the previous heading, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Member of the Executive Council of Welfare v Kate68 unanimously held that a state official could be held liable for contempt of court. Given this fact, there is no reason why a state official should not be held civilly liable in delict for not complying with a court order or for simply not performing adequately in his capacity as state employee. Since the state has no choice but to act through its functionaries and officials, there is no better incentive to get the job done properly than the threat of personal civil liability for a dereliction of duties in their capacities as state employees. A further advantage of delictual liability is that the wronged person can be reimbursed for any loss or damage suffered.
Section 16 of the Social Assistance Act provides for the delegation of powers by the Executive Council and by the National Director-General of Welfare to the provincial Director-General and to officials in the employment of that department. If these powers have been so delegated and assigned to the various individuals, there is no need to second guess who should be held accountable in a delictual claim. As seen, the implementation of a court order by the state is dependent on the will to act and the competence of these state employees.69 Without individual accountability, there is no incentive, other than one's own sense of morality, which cannot always be guaranteed, to do one's job diligently. Where there has been contempt of court, delictual responsibility This includes the duties to uphold the rule of law… As the ultimate executive authority in the province the Premier thus bears the ultimate responsibility to ensure that the provincial government honours and obeys all judgments of the courts against it. The second respondent, the Member of the Executive Council for Finance, bears the same general Constitutional duties as those of the Premier, except that he does not bear the ultimate executive authority of the Premier. In addition, however, he bears the responsibility for decisions of the provincial treasury. This would include decisions relating to the payment of judgments against the province for the payment of money.
The third respondent, as a Member of the Executive Council for Social Development, in addition to being subject to the general constitutional duty of upholding, respecting and enhancing the rule of law, bears particular responsibility in that regard as the executive member of the department administering social grants.
So too does the fourth respondent. He is the accounting officer of the provincial department for social development. This means that amongst other duties, he is responsible for the payment of social grants, including those instances where the province is ordered to pay such grants by the courts.
Each of the four respondents thus bears the constitutional duty to act in accordance with the rule of law, which in the context of this application means that they must ensure that court orders made against the province are paid. That has not been done in a large number of individual cases referred to in this application. This failure, on the papers, is not the result of individual mistakes made by lower ranking officials. It is the result, on the one hand, of a fundamental misconception on the part of the province, represented by the respondents, about their duty to protect, uphold and enhance the rule of law. On the other hand it is the result of the lack of any systematic process of dealing with judgments for the payment of money granted by the courts against the province. The respondents represent the face of the province to the public. Between the four of them they are the state functionaries constitutionally and statutorily responsible for the payment of court orders made against the province in social grant matters.70 (Footnotes omitted; our emphasis.)
A better solution would be for the court, once there has been a breach of duty on the part of the state, to name the persons responsible for fulfilling the terms of the order in terms of a structural interdict. If these terms are not abided by, then the named persons could be held liable for damages suffered on the basis of a delictual claim, provided of course that either negligence or mala fides on their part can be proved.71
The main advantages of a delictual claim are that the person who has suffered a loss is reimbursed for his or her loss and secondly it is an effective means of achieving accountability. To those who perceive personal delictual liability of state officials as a drastic measure, our response is two-fold. Firstly, drastic times call for drastic measures. When something as fundamental to the fabric of our society such as the rule of law is threatened and when the result of this is that the poorest sections of society are denied their constitutional rights to socioeconomic rights and ultimately to life, it is clear that this state of affairs simply cannot be allowed to continue. Secondly, in the light of the fact that in order to succeed in a delictual claim both wrongfulness and damages have to be proved, there will be no liability unless the state official acted in an 2) It declared that the Eastern Cape provincial government has a legal obligation and competence to satisfy the payment of court orders sounding in money made against the Provincial Revenue Fund.
3) The court set out time frames within which government must comply and report back to court of the manner and extent of their compliance. 4) Finally the court made provision for the Applicant to return to court and pursue contempt proceedings (and/or other competent relief) upon failure of the government (at par 39). 71 Obviously the state can also be held vicariously liable for its employees' wrongful acts. PER /PELJ 2007(10)3 21/159 unreasonable manner. This is an objective test based on the convictions of the community. Therefore:
The basic question is whether, according to the legal convictions of the community and in the light of all the circumstances of the case, the defendant infringed the interests of the plaintiff in a reasonable or an unreasonable manner.72
Before a state official will be required to pay money out of his own pocket, he must have objectively conducted himself in an unreasonable manner. We do not think it is too much to ask of public officials that they act reasonably in the circumstances. Obviously, more can be expected of higher ranking officials. It does not seem unreasonable to expect those who occupy important positions in the employment of the state to be made accountable for their conduct in that capacity.
The second hurdle for delictual accountability, namely that the defendant acted wrongfully in causing the damages to the plaintiff, will ensure that innocent state officials who have done their duties in a reasonable manner do not have to pay damages. However, the disregard for human dignity and for the rule of law displayed by the officials of the Department of Social Welfare in the Eastern Cape is so outrageous that it will easily qualify as wrongful for the purposes of a delictual claim.
Conclusion
Personal accountability, be it civil or criminal on the part of state officials, is in The judiciary's innovative implementation of the structural interdict makes for an effective order in that time frames for fulfilment of the order can be set.
Secondly, the courts can play a supervisory role in ensuring compliance with the order. If an order spells out the obligations of each named individual, and the order is not complied with, the hurdle of identifying who to sue in a delictual claim, or who to hold liable for contempt of court, will have been surpassed.
Finally, in order to save time and costs the order can possibly state, as was suggested in Thozamile,74 that should the order not be complied with, the applicants can at a later stage proceed on the same papers.
The structural interdict need not take the form of a money order, but can nevertheless achieve the same result. For example, the order can provide that a state official or several named state officials must see to it that systems are put in place in order to ensure that the applicants' social grants are promptly paid out. Since this is not a money order, it circumvents the rule that a state official cannot be liable for contempt of court when a money order is not adhered to. In this way the state officials, in addition to being held liable in delict, can also be found criminally liable and imprisoned for contempt of court should they fail to abide by the terms of the structural interdict. In a delictual claim, the applicant must prove wrongfulness. Similarly, in a case for contempt of court, the defendant who furnishes good reasons for not adhering to the court order will be exempt.
We believe that personal accountability of lazy and incompetent state officials is an effective way of ensuring that the rule of law is upheld and that socio- economic rights are delivered to the poorest of the poor. Personal accountability will encourage state officials to perform up to standard thus discouraging litigation and the consequent unnecessary financial burden on the state.75
We are certainly not faced with insurmountable difficulties. The courts have already in a very innovative fashion created remedies not only to assist the poor in effectively executing their orders but also in restoring equality before the law.76
75 In Vumazonke v MEC 2005 (6) SA 229 (SE) 234 at par 5 Plasket J provided the following estimates: "I have obtained from the Registrar a copy of a bill taxed in a similar matter…On that basis these matters tax out at about R 4000 per case. It would mean therefore that in today's cases alone about 100 000 will be paid out in legal costs in respect of the fees and disbursements of the legal representatives of the applicants. Clearly millions of rand in taxpayers' money have been wasted in unnecessary legal costs occasioned by indolence and/or incompetence on the part of public servants." 76 There always is the possibility of structural remedies against the National Social Development Department and/or Social Security Agency to ensure that proper systems are put in place. 
